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Abstract
appeared to signal a transition

The 1988 Mexican elections

away from one party rule and toward an open system.

attempts to

the underlying economic causes of this trend and its likely

course.

To analyze Mexican politics,

timeliness.

The thesis

the likely
political

the research

articles

is organized chronologically

beginning in the 1970's

emerging need for political

alternatives.

These two factors

government has been forced to open the system to retain

toward an open political

years.

coincide to
As a result,

the future course of events.

some social

system are much brighter

unrest.

the

some credibility.

The

Mexico is heading

system but will arrive there only after

economic pains and possibly
and political

policy and the

of the ruling party and government.

conclusion. attempts to predict

groups and

It was discovered that the opening of the

system is tied to two major variables--economic

reduce the legitimacy

to ensure

space to the emerging role of opposition

course of future events.

future

included books with

and contemporary periodical

and devotes considerable

.

This thesis

identify

background information

.

in Mexican politics

further

The future of the economic

than at any time in the past twenty

.
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Mexico:

The Political

The stunning results

Consequences of Restructuring

of the July 6, 1988 election

Mexico focused attention

on the changing Mexican political

years,

Revolutionary

the Institutional

presidency by large majorities;
educated

Carlos

and defeated
National

Salinas

Action

Party

Party (PRI) had easily

de Gortari,

narrowly

received

candidates,

Manuel Clouthier

Reconciliation

(FCRN).

development
role

policies

of other

events.

will

of the rightist

factors

will

In doing this,

of the election

role

electorial

also be considered

it is first

Cardenist

As is the case in most elections,

examine the important

play in the changing

Harvard

of the votes

(PAN) and Cuahtemoc Cardenas of the leftist

This thesis

For sixty

won the

a majority

the economy and economic policy were at the forefront
campaign.

system.

however, in 1988, the PRI candidate,

the two opposition

Front for National

.

for the presidency of

economic conditions
process

as will

in Mexico.

the course

and
The

of future

necessary to present a brief background of

Mexico under the PRI.
The PRI was created
Revolutionary

Party).

in 1929 (its

It was created

term was six years (sexenio)

original

name was the National

in a system in which the presidential

and re-elections

were prohibited.

assumed power in a country which had seen a half million
villages

destroyed,

revolution

and civil

numerous political

.

benefit

persons killed,

and its economy in shambles after years of bitter
war.

Under the sexenio of Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940)

and labor reforms were enacted.

However, to receive

from the reform, one had to jOin the party or an affiliated

organization.
organizations
political

The party

Furthermore, businessman were excluded from the party and its
(yet the PRI is basically

system, power is centralized

a pro-business

party).

in the presidency;

Within the

consequently,

the

.
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judicial

and legislative

bureaucrats

considerable

corruption.

branches of government are weak.
power.

The system created flexibility

The PRI apparatus controls

PRI traditionally
considerable

Mexican law gives

has restricted

the election

numerous civil

process.

rights,

as well as
Although the

it has presided over

economic growth.

During the period between 1940 to 1970, Mexico experienced tremendous
economic growth.

The nation's

gross national

product increased

average of 6%. However, the population grew steadily
benefits

were distributed

major investor

.

grew rapidly
impressive

within the country.

economic growth during

will

political

and the economic

The government maintained a role as a
Also, during this time, industrialization

and became an important aspect of the economy. Despite the

economic problems
thesis

unevenly.

since

the early

examine the underlying
systems

since

this

period.

1970's.

.

Mexico has experienced

It is at this

changes

point

that

severe

this

in the Mexican economic and

1970.

The Echeverria

Sexenio:

Problems of LeQitimacy

During the late 1960's many Mexicans (the middle class,
students

at an annual

and business people) became virtually

government, this created a feeling
The middle class was particularly

intellectuals,

nonparticipant

in the

of exclusion from the political

process.

concerned with the lack of representation,

this coincided with a worldwide student movement. Together, these two
conditions

.

festered

the student protests

of 1968.

was divided on how to deal with these protests.
ensued delivered
110).

The political
The brutal

a blow to the already dubious legitimacy

Consequently,

bureaucracy

repression

which

of the PRI (Newell

in 1968 the consensus about the government began to erode

and the party began to come under attack from broad based factions

on both the

.
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left

and the right

permanent state

(114).

Since that occurred,

of crisis

and its relative

Echevarria became the Mexican president
regime's

legitimacy

progressive

was threatened

position

in 1970.

has declined

(114).

Luis

He understood that the

so he adopted leftist

rhetoric

and

reforms (123).

The reforms Echevarria initiated
the final

the PRI has been under a semi-

opportunity

indicate

that he may have felt

for the PRI to reform (Hellman 190).

reforms attempted to redistribute

income and increase

it was

Echevarria's

social

services

(192).

Echevarria also attempted to create rapid economic growth through heavy
government spending (Newell 190).

.

political

consequences.

a corresponding

increase

His policies

The increase

had severe economic and

in public sector spending was not met by

in revenues causing a rise in the federal

(130).

The Mexican federal

billion

pesos in 1976.

deficit

grew from 4.8 billion

deficit

pesos in 1970 to 42

Furthermore, the peso's competitive

rate became

overvalued which raised the price of Mexican goods and reduced sales and
export revenues (Hellman 209).
billion

pesos as a result

loss of capital

The overvalued peso caused a loss of 4 to 6

of capital

Eventually,

of private

from the upper class

investments caused a recession

borrowing increased the inflation
(198).

flight

rate which outstripped

the state's

With the decline

economic dividends to all.

economic problems.
legitimacy

wages
in the role

(200).

Echevarria attempted to maintain the failing
distributing

the rising

role expanded in every sector of the

economy causing a rapid expansion of the state

.

in the economy. Foreign

the peso was devalued (210).

sector investment,

(197). The

consensus of the PRI by

The policy created corresponding

Consequently, the economic solution

created more damage to the political

to the problems of

system than would have a

.

5
political

solution.

would accelerate

Like Echevarria,

Jose Lopez Portillo's

the descent towards financial

LODez: The Politiss
Jose Lopez Portillo

became president

witnessed the rise of political
administration
agricultural

suffered
returns,

later

policies

and economic chaos.

of Oil

in 1976.

His term in office

reforms and continued economic crisis.

from nagging Mexican problems:
uncompetitive

industries,

Lopez'

diminishing

an inability

to cut the

budget, and losses of revenue.
Lopez initially

.

cuts

prepared a severe austerity

in economic and social

with the private

sector

the bureaucracy,

cuts

was rapid.

deficit

spending.

to increase
in welfare

There was a return

(Hellman 218).

led to new revenues,

program which implied major

In addition,
productivity

spending
of capital

he also attempted
(Newell 205).

and a floating

rate

increased

With limits

of payments

of oil in Mexico

spending and continued deficits

(Newell 218).

Lopez found that he was unable to prevent inflation

by increase

oil to meet the rising

Despite the oil income,

expectations

revenues were insufficient

(Hellman 219).

to meet new budget increases

on

peso recovery

and a lower balance

However, discovery of huge reserves

to work

(220).

the pumping of

The oil income

also created a boom in government spending to improve industrial
infrastructure

in order to develop an export led economic growth (219).

exceeded Echevarria's

.

bankrupt (Lake 41).

policy of creating
Billions

of dollars

18) and Lopez allowed the deterioration

state

business,

however, most went

were wasted on oil projects
and collapse

(Kondrake

of non oil exports.

Because export income was weakened, Lopez turned to foreign borrowing.
thus experienced on eight fold increase

Lopez

in foreign debt from 1976-1982

Mexico

.

6
(Hellman 220).
devaluation

The overvalued

resulted

the price

of oil

in the doubling

in the early

looked abroad to finance
billion

by 1982.

couldn't
(224).

peso again led to capital

1980's created

the deficit

Foreign

of the foreign

flight

debt

(223).

a tremendous

and the foreign

banks were forced

and a
The fall

deficit.

Lopez

debt skyrocketed

to bailout

of

to $80

Mexico when it

meet its payments because the banks were overextended in the country
One of Lopez' final

economic policies

was to nationalize

the banks in

Mexico.

The expropriation
the civil

.

society with members of the party choosing sides (Newell 263).

Lopez' initial

the left;
left

of banks in Mexico created two opposing groups within

programs of austerity

thus,

(205).

of parties

of 400 representative

give the opposition

left

as Echevarria)

of PRI.

seats to the opposition

reform to appease the

prisoners.

First,

Second, it guaranteed

100 out

in the Chamber of Deputies.

The goals of these measures were to

a voice, to channel discontent

of co-optation;

wing parties

political

room to maneuver from

reforms contained three elements.

on the left

Third, amnesty for political

prospects

political

Lopez attempted to institute

Lopez' political

legitimization

required

and to increase

the

what the reform did was to produce a flourishing

(Mexico's 106).

In summary, the efforts

to revive populism in order to sustain

by Lopez (as well

legitimacy,

created a huge rise in the public sector bureaucracy (161).

of

failed

and

His policies

also

destroyed the chance Mexico had to fully develop using oil revenues (Lake 41).

.

Because of Lopez' failed

policies,

the new president,

Miguel de la Madrid,

faced numerous economic problems.
De 1a Madrid and Economic RestructurinQ
Miguel de la Madrid's

economic policy

included

in the 1980's
a change in trade

and

.
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investment

policy.

He embraced export promotion and privatization

economy because it was a way to restructure
83).

the troubled economy (Mexico's

The policy of export promotion included pushing Mexico into the world

market.

Under Madrid's sexenio (1982-1988), Mexico joined the General

agreement on Tariffs

and Trade (GATT), began to promote non-oil exports,

opened the door for increased foreign investment.
a result

of these policies

(Baker 78).

announced it would lower protection
done to an increased competitive

mid 1970's, a distinctive

feature

was a diversified

of exports.

exciting

-- the oil

traditional
steps

pattern

source

of non-oil

policies,

This was

so as to lessen

It is ironic that before the
economic development

The factor which made the 1970's so

boom -- was also the cause of the undoing of this
of economic strength

by 1985 oil

still

(58).

It was clear

the non oil exports
accounted

currency earnings and for 45% of the entire
even after

sectors.

industries

of Mexico's successful

had to be taken to help increase

Madrid's

Business confidence grew as

on eight key industrial

ability

and

In 1985, the Mexican government

dependence on petroleum exports (Mexico's 65).

.

of the

that

by 1985, more

of Mexico.

for 70-75% of Mexico's

government revenue.

Despite
foreign

This occurred

the drop in the price of oil during the early 1980's (58).

Another

recovery policy was to place the peso on a free float which caused major
devaluations.

These policies

created certain

trends in the economy during

this decade.
Along the Mexican/U.S. border labor intensive

.

maquiladores,

began to flourish.

These assembly plants are closely

the U.S. economy and include such corporations
Hitachi and Sony.
among the lowest

assembly plants,

called
tied to

as Zenith, General Motors,

These companies locate in Mexico because the workers are
paid in the world (LaBotz 180).

These maquiladores

represent

.
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an important source of foreign investment and are crucial
recovery and modernization goals (Aguilar 55).
promoting policies

Another result

well.

Furthermore, foreign investment has increased

(Mexico's 78) there was a repatriation

did rise

(Graham 30).

government still

of the export

is that property and labor incomes of the export sector

have performed relatively
overall

to the PRI's

of capital

and non oil exports

Despite some success with these policies,

faced economic problems are well as political

the Mexican
problems and

corruption.
Political

Conseauences

of Economic Restructurinq

As is the case in the United States,

.

tremendous
consensus

political

ramifications.

evidence

of widespread

of Mexicans believe
government

serves

two out of three

the result
outlet

It appears

of the PRI is evaporating.

provides

that
its

their

rather

54%

the

Furthermore,
attitudes

are

measures, the lack of a political

and corruption.

on Mexican society.

persons lost their

(Weiner 54).

workers from Mexico.

in 1987 that one thousand
of Madrid's policy of moving the

new laws which allowed only on

This closed off a safety valve for

Mexico and allowed into the United States,
afford to lose.

have had negative

Further problems in the economy

occurred because the United States initiated
influx of skilled

policies

It was estimated

job everyday as a result

system toward privatization

.

The evolving

in Mexico

found that

and that

than the people's.

Many of Madrid's economic and austerity
affects

The poll

never recover

more democracy.

over austerity

the revolutionary

New York Times poll

in Mexico.

economy will

Mexicans desire

that

A recent

discontent

own interests

of frustration

the economy of Mexico has

workers which Mexico could ill

Furthermore, debt rescheduling

arrangements for Mexico's $100

.

9

billion

debt were merely stop gap measures (Graham 31) and Mexico's domestic

debt are more burdensome than its foreign debt (Lake 41).
greatest

crisis

occurred because of a reaction

to austerity.

In 1985, Mexico was required to institute
all areas of the government.
billion

International

the austerity
industries

Mexicans are suffering

budget cutbacks in virtually

This occurred because of conditions

Monetary Fund (IMF) loan (Hellman 230).

program was that the least

disappeared

Perhaps the

(231).

competitive

Inflation

the majority

has continually

100%mark and the foreign debt is in excess of $120 billion.

.

purchasing power of Mexicans has fallen

First,

of

of

hovered over the
Furthermore, the

by over 40% (Kondrake 16) and Mexicans

are spending 60-70% of their wage of food (Lake 40).
three main reasons.

One result

government owned

After years of austerity,

(Baker 79).

on a $4

This has occurred for

part of the governments austerity

restraint

to help control

inflation.

inflation

which seriously

eroded the incomes of many Mexicans.

program was wage

This occurred at a time of high
Second, there

is a high level of overt unemployment and less obvious underemployment.
Finally,
realistic

the government policy of liberalization

exchange rate increased prices considerably

arguable that the level of discontent
if the PRI did not have control

over austerity

questions

domination of the economy and its polices.
economic crisis
the policies

it helped create,

but the entire

It is

would have been greater

as a result

It is clear to

of the PRI's

Clearly the PRI's handling of the

caused many Mexicans to question not only

system.

The 1988 Elections:

and a more

(Mexico's 75).

over the unions (Graham 31).

see why Mexico faces many political

.

of price controls

An Outlet of Frustration?

.
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The 1988 Mexican presidential

and congressional

marked a turning point in Mexican political
successor.

Carlos Salinas de Gortari,

There was virtually,

Nevertheless,

the election

the government.

of victory

.

was the closest

by many as a result

in sixty years of PRI control

of PRI infighting

of

of the

over the margin

The announced vote total

gave Salinas a

and may have been a symbol of the new opening of the process.

Indeed, Salinas conceded that the days of one party domination were over
(Riding 1).

The economic crisis

of the seventies

abrupt end to the Mexican economic miracle.
appeared to deteriorate.
1980's.

Political

political

Political

discontent

In addition,

conditions

has resulted

bargains and accommodations.

and eighties

brought an

social

conditions

also began to change in the

from a disruption

of longstanding

The 1982 bank nationalizations

severely weakened an informal agreement between the ruling elite
business sector
have increased
privatization
their

political

party.

.

task of

at the minimum, continued

delay in announcing the results

which should be announced.

narrow victory

Madrid's designated

no doubt that Salinas would win (as he did).

The considerable

voting was interpreted

evolution.

may have

faced the usually difficulty

winning votes on a platform which included,
austerity.

elections

(Mexico's 101).
their

This has occurred as the nation's

economic power as a result

joining

of the economy. Furthermore, the businessmen have increased
power although they cannot directly

Their political

be represented

power has increased as a result

strength,

groups, the cooperation
parties

businessmen

of Madrid's policy of

though its popular sector of the PRI, through its control
pressure

and the

of its influence
over appointments,

of important American partners

such as the PAN(Hellman 211).

within the

and through

Coupled with the growing

many commercial groups believe that the rules of the economic and

.

.
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political

game must be changed to create a new legal and political

conducive to economic growth (Aguilar 50).
displeasure

believes

(Dowling 46).

much of their

parties

The opposition

.

of these
years

alter

has created disenchantment

has increased

factors

partly

helped make Salinas

Despite

the many problems,

Mexico's

economic policy.

Blatant and

(Mexico's 101).

Furthermore,

for the PRI (101).

because the PRI altered
economic pressures

the least

popular

on Salinas
holding

that

In fact,

(occurring

after

campaign (Graham 30).

to relax

austerity,

he will

down wages and devaluing

These policies

Salinas'

it appears

the

(Rohter

candidate

Salinas

it was Salinas

for many of the PRI's economic policies.

dampened Salinas'

.

strength

under Lopez to relieve

the Mexican stock market

selling

in the political

3).

All

of the PRI in

(Dowling 46).

responsible

65).

the

Also, a large amount of working class persons have lost

have created a new an vigorous challenge

structure

including

for the economic

There are other problems for the PRI.

widespread corruption

political

that one party rule is responsible

buying power and desire broader participation

process (Baker 65).

opposition

to business

over the economy, a large segment of the population,

middle class,
crisis

In addition

climate

the fall

owned business

the crash

of

is tremendous

continue

pressure

the policy
exports

of
(Baker

Other items in

of lowering trade barriers,

(Dowling 47).

These policies

and
may

boost business confidence in the government but many Mexican's and their
unions fear a loss of jobs.

Salinas must also manage a complex price control

scheme few Mexicans believe will work (47).

is

of the U.S. market)

give Salinas the label of anti-labor.

hundred state

who, under Madrid,

the peso in order to generate

economic agenda include continuation
three

not drastically

Clearly,

Although there
most likely

will

Clearly,

there is increasing

.
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discontent

over the economic policies

legitimacy

of the PRI.

and many are beginning

Politics
The PRI controls

given out to loyal
influenced

by the PRI.

vote fraud

is often

.

Furthermore,

workers

levels

numerous economic and political
machine,

The government controls
and deliver

their

the election

problems.

the PRI in order to maintain benefits
those controls

process,
(18).

What

perpetuate

its

Although the PRI may
more power to control

70% of the economy and labor

by the PRI.

job are

of Mexico is

of PRI representation

it has considerably

vote to the PRI.

peasants live is controlled

the 1988 election)

every sector

the PRI controls

political

Patronage

the PRI has been able to indefinitely

be compared to a big city
events.

a big city

(Kondrake 17).

and virtually

used to maintain

it amounts to is that
power despite

American cities

PRI supporters

the

of the PRI

the government of Mexico like

machine used to control

to criticize

leaders

control

Much of the land on which most

Finally,

business must openly support

from the PRI.

For sixty years (until

have ensured that no president,

governor or

senator was elected who was not a PRI member. This had occurred despite
fact that a gallup poll,

taken before the formation of a left-wing

in Mexico revealed that only 40%of the population
19%supported the PAN, 30% favored no party,
parties.

The left wing coalition

support in the 1988 election

.

Clearly,

the

coalition,

supported the PRI whereas

and 10%supported other left

headed by Cardenas captured considerable

from those who previously

favored no party (17).

coercion or pressure had to be placed on persons to force them to

support the PRIor else some other party would have been able to win at least
one larger

election.

The recent trend in Mexican presidential

toward lowering the percentile

of votes for the PRI nominee.

elections

is

The PRI share of

.
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votes fell

from 80% in earlier

the 1988 elections.

presidential

elections

However, because the opposition

divided between right wing and left wing parties
party,

the PRI would probably win at least

elections

(Aguilar 52).

alternative

is fractionalized

a plurality

relationship

which favor the PRI.

to the PRI power currently,

.

state

First,
the

Second, the

(52).

in the
What all

may point to, is a change in the way the PRI conducts its

business politically.
PRI and government arrangements have failed
political

demands through the party's

demands of the Mexican population
democratic aspirations
stability

electoral

(Mexico's 161).

against

that of another.

private

sector over the public's

to channel important
process.

The increasing

are a product of material

in Mexico was that the state

For years,
alternated

deprivation

the essential
the influence

However, in the long run the state
interest

(4).

and

aspect of
of one group

has favored the

This has created

a catalyst

for uneven development.

By the late 1970's, the upper 10%of the population

held 36.7% of the entire

national

population

family income whereas the lowest 30% of the

accounted for only 6% of national

These numbers show a tremendous disparity

.

(53).

of the system has not created a disruption

between the people and the PRI controlled

these factors

and

in free and open

people are unwilling to commit themselves to other parties
debate over the fairness

over 50% in

with the PRI as the centrist

There are other factors

because there is no credible

to a little

the vast lower class.
the rhetorical
constitution
(43).

Thus, the political

family income (Aguilar 44).

between the small upper class and
system helped create two worlds,

passages of economic and political

equality

in the 1917

and the real world of uneven development and informal power codes

Despite this truth,

there is still

a frequency in the United States to

.
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overstate

the political

influence

and business groups (10).
has created

of the Mexican upper class,

The system of a strong president

system of Mexico with a strong president

independent and enormous bureaucracy creates
The corruption

in the system is further

availability

of large sums of "drug" money as a result
Because all ruling politicians

and a virtually

a system which is ripe for

corruption.

narcotics.

enhanced by the
of the sale of illegal

and bureaucrats

are from the PRI,
in the government

they tend to hide corruption.

Therefore,

the real thieves

are able to retain

possession

of money (Lake 40).

untroubled,

example is the fact that President
(41).

What these conditions

Lopez Portillo

left

office

Indeed, a prime
a very rich man

have done is to erode the legitimacy

and immense

power of the PRI.
The legitimacy

of a regime is related

(Lake 2) and its responsiveness
population.

Clearly,

in the PRI political

legitimacy

(3).

the opposition.

sanctioned

values of the

the PRI is lacking in these two areas.

The slow shift

and economic values toward more private

resources

stability

the PRI strategy

and, consequently,

assures the opposition

and co-opt

of opponents into

a means to express their

to build their

within the system (Aguilar 51).

views,

own constituencies

There are other reasons to

explain the loss of some of the PRI's tremendous power.
thought of as a semi-authoritarian,

its

are created to help maintain control

of integration

to campaign, and the opportunity

and interests

sector

policy has been to integrate

Although these policies

competition

of the regime

and societal

The PRI's political

our other interests,

to the stability

to the political

involvement is changing the leadership's

.

and bureaucracy

another unforeseen side affect--corruption.

The political

.

middle class,

The PRI can be

hegemonic party which acts as an

.
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instrument of government to maintain the social elites
159).

The PRI is thus an extension of a strong presidency and the

bureaucracy.

The decline of the PRI could reflect

presidential

system which manifests

Consequently,

significant

party discussion
A final

determinant

a decline

in the

into a decline of PRI functions.
system will not result

but from the president

and bureaucracy

in the decline of the PRI is tied to civil

from

(160).

society.

As

servants who were not PRI members grew, the PRI hegemony

began to weaken (Newell 269).

Whatever the cause of the decline of the PRI's

hegemony, there

groups prepared

apparently

are opposition

to take advantage

of the

opening system.

The DDDosition Parties
The 1988 elections
challengers

witnessed

for the presidency.

it was faced with widespread

Manuel Clauthier

coalition
leader

was named after

election

as their

candidate

opposition

time since
rule.

the PRI took power,

The two challengers

were

candidate.

of the threat

to only 50.32%.
the older

(FCRN). The

Lozaro Cardenas who was a beloved

These two opposition

them, the challengers

must understand

to its

Cardenas' father

groups were opposed by the PRI

Because the PRI controls

apparatus and, consequently,

the seriousness
against

For the first

Front for National Reconstruction

of the revolution.

with Salinas

the emergence of two very strong

of the National Action Party (PAN) and Cuahtemoc Cardenas

Solorzano of the Cardenist

.

itself

changes in the political

and decisions

the number of civil

.

in power (Mexico's

the elections,

the media,

many observers wrote off

posed by the two challengers.
lowered the percentage

To understand
challenge

the rising

the

Despite the odds

of votes going to the PRI
challenge

to the PRI, one

of the PANand the emerging challenge

of a

.
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coalition

of left

wing parties.

The right wing PANattracts

primarily

businessmen.

Recently,

however,

many moderates have joined the PANin order to campaign for curbing state
authority

(Aguilar 50).

which border the United States which may be attributed

to the growth of

business

support

in the area.

The strengths
rural

that

weaknesses,

no strong

by the fact

for opposition

that

left

because

that

of its

these

This assertion

in the late

1970's made
the

The PANhas also made numerous gains
Despite

by definition,

a relatively

promising

to the PRI comes from the

a revolutionary

economic shift

from the left.

to a centrist

party

party

devoted

from the right,

to
however,

the PRI has opened itself

to

The PRI's acceptance of the center of the political
and an aggressive

weakening of the PRI's claim as the sole inheritor

It has been easier

for the left

right,

to attract

to attract

from the PRI. Another problem for the PRI is that,

has led to a

of the nations revolution.

The loss of this symbolism has enabled the opposition
intellectuals.

Despite

in the Chamber of Deputies,

the major threat

spectrum, flanked by an emerging left

.

This criticism

in strength.

it would seem to be open more to challenge

challenges

of the PAN

parties.

Because the PRI is,
equality,

106).

reforms

to win seats

(Hellman 237).

for the PAN, it appears
leaning

(Mexico's

political

in support.

among the urban middle class

The PAN is weak in the

A major criticism

and gaining

since

parties

an upsurge

lives.

in Mexico City.

of the PAN is to oppose the PRI.

the PAN is well organized

PANhas enjoyed

future

its weaknesses.

idealogy

the sole purpose

is reinforced
it easier

considerable

where much of the population

it maintains

suggests

PANalso maintains

of the PANalso reflect

areas

is that

.

The party has tremendous power in the northern states

voters and

these persons away

as a centrist

party,

it

.
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may suffer

from a splintering

of factions

in hegemony. This would most likely
or worse to reaction
fragmentation

away from the center causing a loss

lead to pluralization

and repression

(Mexico's 106-197).

has also occurred within the party.

and democratization
In fact,

a

In 1960, a group emerged

within the PRI called the Democratic Current which was composed of a group of
liberals

who denounced the traditional

attempted to rally

the PRI members and the entire

closed political

system (Aguilar 50).

within the PRI.

The electoral

PRI to adapt their

.

Mexicans notions of power.

electoral

minor changes still
presidential
the president

The group originally

attempted to work

monopoly without losing the presidency
assumed PRI control

system remained secret

(51).

of the presidency

The

The PRI

and closed to questions

because

the dissident

PRI faction,

still

called the Democratic

which was led by Cuahtemoc Cardenas Solorzano, withdrew from the

party after

Salinas,

the Harvard educated technocrat,

successor of Madrid (Baker 65).

and betraying

pushed for an end to the economic policies
IMF. He opposed policies
he is a supporter

of austerity,

of giving priority

policy would include the following:
help alleviate

development.

split

with the PRI

the revolution.

Cardenas

urged by the United States
exports and open markets.

to basic human needs.

and the
Instead,

His economic

1) channeling money to agriculture

the rural poor's conditions,

small and medium sized business,

was named the chosen

Cardenas and his followers

and charged the party with corruption

.

against the

maintains the power to name his successor within the PRI.

Because of this,
Current,

Mexican society

reforms of 1977 and 1986 were an attempt by the

virtually

succession

They

2) provide financial

to

incentives

to

and 3) end the emphasis on large industrial

Cardenas also feels that oil reserves must be conserved and that

production and drilling

should be cut back.

Cardenas is adored by the left

in

.
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Mexico and he was able to form his own political
able to attract

many PRI members and intellectuals

to the 1968 student

protests.

for the 1988 elections.
Unified
PRI.

Socialist

Party

The coalition

not be reached.
the coalition

represents

.

The coalition

consisted

(PSUM) and small right
an alliance

only when facing

became the candidate

wing groups allied

for president

Democratic

showing in 1988 elections,

face.

Leftist

co-optation

the PRI.

Furthermore,

movements which are revolutionary

the election

the
could

and the head of
(FDN) (Lake 30).

it is not known if the FDN

problems which the FDNmust
by the PRI through

many Mexicans are cynical
in nature

revolution

FDNas well as the PANonly slightly

Front

been destroyed

or leftist

nothing to show for the major leftist

against

or merely a weak coalition

These are other

movements have traditionally
or repression.

coalition

of the FCRN, the Mexican

a true viable form in Mexican politics

united

and linked

with the PANbut an agreement

which was named the National

Although it had a strong

who are liberal

Cardenas thus helped form the leftist

attempted
Cardenas

He appeared

organization.

about

because most have

of 1917 (Hellman 239).

challenged their

election

The

losses after

and this may have paved the way for a wider role in future

governments (Rohter 3).
The final

results

in the July 6, 1988 Mexican presidential

election

race

were Salinas with 50.32% of the vote, Cardenas with 31.11% of the vote, and
Clouthier

with 17.7% of the vote.

In addition

the PRI won 261 out of 500

Chamber of deputy seats to maintain a slim majority.

.

questions

about how much power opposition

Deputies because the president
Nevertheless,
media coverage

The future

there are

will have in the Chamber of

maintains considerable

the chamber is at least
(187).

parties

Still,

power (Mexico's 186).

a place to air views and debate with

of the opposition

groups certainly

seems to

.
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be brighter

at the end of the 1980's than at any time in the past sixty years.

The future generation

of Mexicans may very will have more than one political

choice.
Mexican Politics

and Contemporary Society

The combination of economic difficulties,
opposition

parties

and U.S. criticism

Mexico about the political
of tolerance

business alliances

may have caused a changing attitude

system (Mexico's 178).

for the austerity

that governmental layoffs

with

It appears that the level

programs may diminish as a result

have begin to seriously

affect

of the fact

the middle class

This occurred as the need to shrink the budget caused government layoffs

.

sales of public enterprises

to private

have lost patience with inflation,
control

over the judiciary,

and the media (Lake 40).

ownership (54).

In general,

crime waves, poverty,

congress,

treasury,

police,

corruption
election

Mexican politics.

and PRI

apparatus,

There are numerous demographic factors

is under

which will affect

Because of the large number of young persons.

One million

This will put a huge strain

the economy if it does not expand enough to absorb them (Yergin 19).

increasingly

.

political

on

In

to the problem of the large amount of young persons there are other

trends which may bring trouble to the PRI. The Mexican population

Salinas'

and

Another future problem is that at a time when the

new persons enter the work force every year.

addition

(8).

the people

economy is growing slowly (if at all) more than half the population
the age of twenty.

in

urbanized,

better

educated and politically

active.

is becoming
Consequently,

push for a more open economy must also be met with a more open
system (18).

This must occur despite

will be weakened as a result
modernization

of opposition

and economic crisis

the fact that the PRI's power

availability

(Larmer 13).

and problems with

Because of increased

.
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urbanization,

many leaders

of the political

Despite the urban bias, the greatest

comes from rural

areas because many peasants

land.

Nevertheless,

despite

rural persons who receive the least
in the 1988 election,

difficult

to maintain

test

be if,

will

to determine

its

and how well,

if a comprehensive

modernization

from the PRI.

Coincidentally,

(Aguilar

areas

Cardenas,

(190).

areas,

it may be

Perhaps the biggest

can spread the distribution

democratic

it is the

for the rural population.

with the rural

in rural

Salinas

live on PRI

this fact of strong support,

relationship

PRI support

amount of PRI support

(Ejiditarios)

held out support and benefits

Unless the PRI reevaluates

transformation

of wealth

can proceed with

42).

ProsDects for the future
Many PRI insiders
Mexican vulnerability

believe that a true democratic opening will increase
and adversely affect

wonder if an emerging democratization
military

(Mexico's 143).

of Mexico's

economic growth (Aguilar 58).

There are numerous questions

economic and political

what direction

Mexico will

There is little

system.

policy he helped create.
privatization,
industries,

Salinas

will

answers to

but there are some clues as to

and politically.
continue

He will almost certainly

opening the country to trade,
still

concerning the future

There are no definite

move economically

double that

Many

will cause a change in the role of the

the question of Mexico's changing circumstances

~

maintain an urban bias

(Mexico's 189).

controlled

.

parties

with the economic

continue with

pushing non-oil exports

relying on oil income and continued government austerity

programs.

Salinas must make Mexican business and industry more competitive.

By cutting

industries

away from the public sector into the private

wasteful government subsidies

will be eliminated.

sector,

This will force these

.
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business to become more efficient

and will save government revenue.

problem with this policy is that it also has the potential
widespread unemployment as business'
employees.

unneeded or extra

The task of pushing non-oil exports and entering

market are interrelated.
consequently,

is young

the world

Mexico needs access to foreign markets and
Joining GATT was a

had to open its own market to the world.

wise but difficult

move because it opened Mexican markets and made some

vulnerable

some non-competitive

.

to create

This would cause a problem for a society whose population

and growing.

industries

fold or eliminate

The

to foreign competition.
business and exacerbated

This caused the elimination
the unemployment problems.

However, non-oil export sectors

have shown a increase

relatively

prospering.

Despite

the move away from oil

must rely

on petroleum

to bring

in badly needed foreign

alleviate

its

foreign

who wish to conserve

debt problems.
this

This causes

very important

the welcoming of foreign investment.

of

resource.

in growth and are
exports,

concern

revenue

Mexico still
to help

for many Mexicans

Another economic policy

is

Again this brings in foreign revenue but

it also opens up the Mexican economy so that it is tied to the industrial
states.

This could create political

Mexican attitude
policy of Mexico.

of independence.

problems for Salinas because of the
Austerity

undoubtedly continue political

control

optimistic.

will remain and possibly

This will

could be the

signs for the Mexican economy and the

If Mexico can ride out the storm it may

well be on its way to economic recovery,
disparities

over spending.

woes but economic disaster

There are some positive

outlook is cautiously

~

in the economic

Because of its huge foreign and domestic debt, the Mexican

government will have to maintain tight

alternative.

is a major factor

although tremendous income

increase.

.
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It is almost certain

that Salinas'

the PRI numerous political

problems.

economic policies

What is more difficult

political

reforms of the last decade, the growing political

populace,

and the problems with economic recovery are all pushing the country

requires

an opening of the political

of the population
population

The increasing

an opening of debate on economic policy.

recognize this fact.

system.

Some leaders

It is obvious that
cognition

seems to erode the legitimacy

the lack of political

its closed nature.

of the

privatization

of the

This, in turn,
of the PRI seem to

Another problem is that the growing political

understands

knowledge

of the government as the

There is a growing frustration

over

channels over which to voice opinions and attitudes.

It

seems ironic that a government which claims to be open to the people and
revolutionary

in nature closes itself

input from the outside.
has limited

and liberals
Unfortunately,

for growth.

but

has the

It may well be able to lure enough intellectuals

front which has the most questions

The PRI will most likely

until the year 2000.

PRI may also drift

the political

The FDN, if it can remain united,

it is also the political

it continues on a relatively

1994 elections

and prevents

away from the PRI to make it a strong alternative.

about its viability.
party at least

off from the population

The PANwill continue to be a viable opposition

room for expansion.

most potential

~

with

is the future course of the political

economy requires

system.

to predict

certainty

toward a more open system of government.

.

will cause him and

continue to be the majority

However, the party will loss support as

unpopular economic course.

It appears that the

more toward the right of center in the coming years.

will be more open as a result

of Salinas'

system as he opens up the economic system.

PRI seems to be tied to economic recovery.

The

desire to liberalize
The future of the

In the next several years the

.
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political

system will continue to open.

Because Mexico is a Latin American country there are incessant
about possible
professional
military

military

intervention

in the government.

force and under civilian

intervention

control.

prestige.

In short,

military

intervention.

Mexico appears to be opening.

.

recovery after

divisive

and

system of

creeps slowly to the fore of

Furthermore, the Mexican economy may be on the road to
the disastrous

years of the 1970's and 1980's.

liberalization

but continuing

Clearly,

the

the economic and

begun under Madrid in the 1980's.

unrest in the near future but Mexico's future prospects

.

prospect of

and costly to Mexico's

the economic and political

Democratization

Mexicans must move forward cautiously
political

There is little

there appears to be nothing which can be gained by

After sixty years of PRI rule,

Mexican politics.

The Mexican army is a

into government because of its professionalism

because such a role would be internally

questions

There may be some

appear brighter.

.
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